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DATA BREACH (REGULATORY) EFFECTS
David Thaw†

Breach notification laws have been a major driver of data
protection efforts in U.S. organizations for more than a decade. This
form of disclosure-based regulation exists in 47 of 50 U.S. states, as
well as four other U.S. jurisdictions, but has yet to be adopted as a law
of general applicability at the federal level.
This Essay considers the effects the structure of existing
disclosure-based cybersecurity regulation has on the efficacy of U.S.
firms’ cybersecurity measures. Drawing on previous empirical work
and analysis of firm incentives, it suggests two modest conclusions
about the most efficacious legal structures: (1) that any disclosurebased regulation should be part of a broader cybersecurity regulatory
framework and (2) that any risk-of-harm threshold triggering
notification should bear a presumption in favor of notification. Based
on these conclusions, I suggest a preliminary regulatory prescription
for policymakers considering adoption or standardization of disclosurebased regulation in the data protection context.

† David Thaw is an Assistant Professor of Law and Information Sciences at the University of
Pittsburgh and an Affiliated Fellow of the Information Society Project at Yale Law School.
The author thanks the Canada-U.S. Law Institute at Case Western University School of
Law and the participants in the Institute’s 2015 symposium for their feedback and thoughtful
commentary on the scope of cybersecurity. The author also thanks Derek Bambauer, Andrea
Matwyshyn, Paul Mazzucco, and Mark Paulding for their many years of input on the question of
what constitutes cybersecurity.
This Essay is based in part on Testimony the author gave before the United States House of
Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Commerce,
Manufacturing, and Trade on this subject matter on July 18, 2013, available at
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?q=hearing/hearing-on-reporting-databreaches-is-federal-legislation-needed-to-protect-consumers-subcom. The author thanks the
University of Connecticut School of Law and the Yale Law School Information Society Project
for their support of that project. All ideas contained in the original testimony and this work are the
sole product of the author unless otherwise indicated, and all errors are the sole responsibility of
the author.
The author welcomes comments/feedback at dbthaw@pitt.edu.
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INTRODUCTION
This Essay considers the function and effects of data breach
notification regulatory regimes from the perspective of cybersecurity.1
While there are many concerns relevant to a data breach notification
regulatory regime, the focus of this Essay is cybersecurity implications.
In that regard, it considers regulatory structures that are likely to
produce more effective cybersecurity outcomes.2 The primary basis for
this analysis is application of empirical evidence and analytical
modeling. While this Essay does suggest a few modest policy outcomes,
it is not a normative piece in this regard.
I.

CONSIDERING “CYBERSECURITY’S” SCOPE

The term “cybersecurity” is a concept that has become something
of a misnomer. This is, in part, one of the biggest challenges facing
cybersecurity—these varying definitions require different, sometimes
conflicting skill sets and assume different goals. For example, consumer
information data breaches are one of the most socially prevalent aspects
of cybersecurity. Perhaps equally prevalent, however, in the U.S. social
consciousness are the activities of foreign state-sponsored malicious
actors.
Understanding the “cybersecurity problem” and addressing issues
such as data breaches first requires defining a rubric for considering
1
2

See infra notes 5–6 (regarding use of the term “cybersecurity”).
Efficacy can be measured by a variety of metrics but, for the purposes of this Essay, “more
effective at preventing system or data comprise” as a vague, general definition is sufficient to
distinguish the focus of this work from other works. For further discussion of this topic, see
generally David Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 287,
291–93, 294, 342–43 (2014) (discussing how “cybersecurity” efficacy might be empirically
evaluated).
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what are the units of analysis for entities we seek to protect and what
are the substantive areas of expertise and practice which comprise
“security.”
This analysis begins with the latter question of what comprises
security. While perhaps uncommon to consider the evaluative measure
before considering the goal to be evaluated, the degree of ambiguity
surrounding “cybersecurity” requires first discussing the term’s
meaning. By its own etymological roots, the word is misleading—the
root “cyber” historically referred to “electronic system[s] of interlinked
networks of computers . . . .”3 The root first appeared in 1961 and has
expanded in meaning to include later technologies—such as the
Internet—but has always retained its core focus on computers and
computing technologies.4 Not all aspects of the security of computing
and information systems, however, are technological in nature.
Using the term cybersecurity thus is potentially misleading—it
implies a sole focus on technological defenses, when many
“cybersecurity” compromises actually result from attack vectors
primarily compromising a physical or administrative measure. Consider,
for example, the means by which the Stuxnet malware is widely
believed to have been delivered. The predominant theory is that it
infected the control systems of target nuclear material enrichment
facilities via a universal serial bus (USB) thumb drive carrying the
malicious code.5 While it is true that there exist technological protection
measures to provide additional secondary defenses in the event a
malicious USB drive is smuggled into a facility, a focus on these
“technological” defenses both ignores the primary threat and is an
inefficient use of resources. Why was an unauthorized drive allowed
into a sensitive area to begin with? This is a question of physical
security. Similarly, some questions surround the business processes by
which an organization operates—are those processes, such as the
identity verification questions asked by a call center operator,
3
4

WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 343 (3d ed. 1997).
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, “cyber-, comb. form” (3d ed. Jan. 2009), available at
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/250879?rskey=yfQWME&result=7#.
5 See, e.g., Pete Pachal, U.S. Launched Its Biggest Cyberattack From a Thumb Drive,
MASHABLE (June 1, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/06/01/stuxnet-thumb-drive; Joshua
Kopstein, Stuxnet Virus Was Planted by Israeli Agents Using USB Sticks, According to New
Report, THE VERGE (Apr. 12, 2012, 7:32 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2012/4/12/2944329/
stuxnet-computer-virus-planted-israeli-agent-iran. A Google search of “how was Stuxnet
delivered,” demonstrates that the majority of media articles on the topic overwhelmingly support
the position that delivery was via a physically-inserted USB drive, notwithstanding a few
positions to the contrary asserting a network payload delivery mechanism. Those alternative
positions appear to be contradicted by further evidence that the malware “spread” upon which
they base their claim was in fact a result of unintentional containment failure after infection
resulting from programming errors by the malware developers, not as the result of a sophisticated
technical attack as some sources presume. GOOGLE, https://www.google.com (search “how was
Stuxnet delivered;” then follow the hyperlinks for the media articles on the first page) (last visited
Apr. 24, 2015).
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vulnerable to attack? These are questions of administrative security.
These examples describe two areas of security (“physical” and
“administrative”) that are distinct from “technological” security.
Collectively, these three elements adequately describe the aspects of
security.6 Many existing legal frameworks recognize this typology.7
Thus, as I and others describe elsewhere, the concept of “information
security” more accurately describes the exercise of data and information
system protection.8
Thus, when considering cybersecurity, a holistic evaluation,
including the full range of aspects described above, is critical.
Nonetheless, while the term “information security” therefore is more
descriptive, this Essay adopts the term “cybersecurity” for consistency
with popular writing on the subject.9
Against what, then, do our laws and regulations seek to protect?
Scholars, public commentators, and policymakers include a vast array
of systems in discussion of what “cybersecurity” seeks to protect. While
in some contexts, such as privacy, this ambiguity may have advantages,
in the more objective context of security10 ambiguity may lead to
misapplication of techniques and mismatch between security measures
6 Social, economic, and other related factors are orthogonal to this typology—for example, a
psychological (e.g., social engineering) attack may take place against a business process (e.g., the
call center) or against a technical system (e.g., an email “phishing” attack).
7 See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (relevant portions codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(2),
implementing regulations codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial
Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (relevant portions codified at 15
U.S.C. § 6801(b), implementing regulations codified at 16 C.F.R. § 314); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
93H, § 2 (2015) (implementing regulations codified at 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.01–.05). See
also generally Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014).
8 As noted by Professor Andrea Matwyshyn, “[r]eferring to all of information security,
particularly in private sector contexts, as ‘cybersecurity’ is technically incorrect.” Matwyshyn
describes this misnomer as ignoring the aspects of physical security inherent in “holistic”
protection of data maintained by an enterprise. I concur with this assessment, and further suggest,
as consistent with the administrative/technical/physical breakdown adopted by the health care
cybersecurity example (42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(2)), that such a characterization also overlooks
the administrative aspects involved in protecting security information. See Andrea M.
Matwyshyn, Hacking Speech: Informational Speech and the First Amendment, 107 NW. U. L.
REV. 795, 817, n.99 (2013); see also David Thaw, Criminalizing Hacking, Not Dating:
Reconstructing the CFAA Intent Requirement, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 907 (2013)
(discussing the distinction between purely technical restrictions on computer usage and
comprehensive administrative, technical, and physical restrictions thereon). Cybersecurity
remains the common term with which most readers will be familiar, and thus I utilize that term
when describing the matter generally. I further discuss this distinction in later work. See generally
David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. 329, 331 n.2 (2014)
[hereinafter Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture] (discussing when usage of the term
“information security” may be appropriate even when the term “cybersecurity” is adopted for the
purposes of literary consistency).
9 See Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, supra note 8, at 331 n.2.
10 See generally Derek E. Bambauer, Privacy Versus Security, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 667 (2013).
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and protection goals. For example, the security techniques and goals for
protection of strategic weapon control systems are different than the
techniques and goals for an average consumer, for example, protecting
their personal computer used primarily for entertainment purposes.
Defining the unit of analysis that a cybersecurity law or regulation
seeks to address is critical. Approaches necessary for military
environments may be ill-suited—or possibly even damaging—to
ordinary consumer-based commercial environments. This Essay
proposes a four-part classification for entities:
(1) Military, intelligence, and other high-reliability or sensitive
government operations11;
(2) Privately operated “critical infrastructure,” utilities,
communications networks, and other infrastructure operated by
private entities but requiring high-reliability operations or utilizing
meaningful sensitive information;
(3) Public and other government operations, which are not otherwise
sensitive or high-reliability;
(4) Non-critical/non-sensitive private entities, private entities that
neither require high-reliability operations nor utilize meaningful
amounts of sensitive information.

These four categories operate generally along a spectrum from
lowest risk-tolerance (category 1) to highest risk-tolerance (category 4).
Risk-tolerance is not necessarily linear in this regard, however, and
primarily comprises two metrics: (1) “risk-tolerance,” the degree of
sensitivity of information involved in operations and the degree of
reliability12 required for operations, and (2) “efficiency requirements,”
the degree of operational efficiency impairment that an entity can
absorb, while continuing to provide its primary function, operation,
good, or service. With these two metrics, the four categories comprise a
two-by-two matrix more appropriate for analysis:

11 Law enforcement activities split across categories 1 and 3. Quite obviously, certain
activities such as anti-terrorism, counter-intelligence operations, RICO, and other undercover
operations would fall under category 1. Other operations such as civil enforcement (e.g., parking)
and community policing efforts seem well-aligned with category 3. Some activities pose grey
areas on which law enforcement experts are likely to disagree. Such disagreement, and indeed the
idea that law enforcement splits across these categories, however, is outside the scope of and not
relevant to the conclusions of this Essay.
12 See Bambauer, supra note 10.
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Reduced Efficiency Requirements

Limited RiskTolerance

•

Government: Critical
(Category 1)

•

Government: Non-Critical
(Category 3)

Greater RiskTolerance

•

Private: Critical
Infrastructure*
(Category 2)

•

Private: Non-Critical
(Category 4)

* While certain aspects of privately operated critical infrastructure have
lower risk-tolerance than others (e.g., electrical and water grids), such
infrastructure overwhelmingly is provided by for-profit private entities.13

A more extensive discussion of this typology is forthcoming in
Cybersecurity Stovepiping;14 however, for the purposes of this analysis
of data breach regulation, the “risk tolerance” axis is informative. The
substantial majority of jurisdictions’ breach notification statutes do not
apply to government entities.15 For this reason, the analysis in this Essay
focuses on the implications for private entities. Private entities vary in
their “efficiency requirements” but generally have a greater risktolerance, as they primarily comprise for-profit enterprises that have a
primary fiduciary responsibility to deliver financial return to their
shareholders/owners. If the cost of the required degree of security for
satisfactory operation were to exceed the ability of such organizations to
provide a good or service, the standard market expectation would be
that the organization would discontinue provision of the good or
service—not that they would incur a loss by doing so.
For these reasons, private entities must be considered as a separate
unit of analysis for the purpose of considering the effects of data breach
regulation. The remaining Parts assume private entities as the unit of
analysis and do not differentiate between private “critical infrastructure”
(category 2) and “non-critical” private entities (category 4), as the
points made in those Parts are equally applicable to both categories.

13
14

For a more thorough analysis, see Thaw, infra note 14.
David Thaw, Cybersecurity Stovepiping (Univ. of Pitt. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research
Paper, forthcoming 2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2572012.
15 See generally, Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS.,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breachnotification-laws.aspx (last visited Apr. 5, 2015) (providing direct links to a multi-jurisdictional
survey of the data breach notification laws in place as of the time of this writing, excluding
federal industry sector-specific statutes/regulations).
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COMPREHENSIVE REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS

Legislatures often consider data breach notification regulation
distinctly from other elements of cybersecurity regulation. Of the 51
U.S. jurisdictions to have adopted such regulations, nearly all (except
Massachusetts) did so originally as a free-standing statute, and only a
few additional jurisdictions (e.g., California, Nevada) have later
amended their regulations to expand the scope beyond breach
notification.16
This Essay proposes two reasons why breach notification should
not continue to be adopted in this standalone, piecemeal fashion. First,
doing so creates the risk of unanticipated consequences and
“definitional lock-in.” Second, empirical research demonstrates that
comprehensive cybersecurity regulation is nearly four times more
effective at preventing reportable breaches than are breach notification
regulations alone.
A.

“Definitional Lock-In”: The Risks of Standalone Breach
Notification

Standalone regulation is attractive to legislatures. It reduces
technical complexity, eases the burden of legislative drafting, and may
be more politically feasible than comprehensive approaches. Piecemeal
regulation, however, ignores the general concern that when later
regulations must be adopted, such adoption does not occur in a
vacuum—and may interact in unexpected ways with previous
regulations.17 Breach notification should be considered as part of
overall, comprehensive cybersecurity regulation to avoid unexpected
results from such piecemeal approaches.
Adopting standards for breach notification in the absence of
comprehensive cybersecurity regulation will create “definitional lockin” for categories defined to serve the purpose of breach notification but
not well-suited for later adoption to broader, comprehensive
cybersecurity regulation. Key definitions in regulations will be
determined at an early stage, based on a limited scope of purpose not
well-suited for the broader purposes later envisioned. Specifically, key
definitions, such as the subject of information to be protected (often
referred to as “Personal Information”), will be defined for the purposes
of consumer breach notification. These purposes are likely very
16 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, §§ 2–3 (2015); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29, 1798.81.5–
1798.82 (West 2015); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 603A.010 et seq. (2014).
17 Some scholars have indirectly suggested similar thoughts in other contexts. See, e.g., Todd
Donnelly Batson, Note, No Vacancy: Why Immigrant Housing Ordinances Violate FHA and
Section 1981, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 131, 135 (2008).

158

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE•NOVO

2015

different than those appropriate to comprehensive cybersecurity
regulation. Lock-in occurs as a result of the substantial cost to
organizations of later “re-classifying” information based on additional
categories established by new regulation. This process, when applied to
existing data,18 is often cost-prohibitive and may raise regulatory
burdens too high for effective compliance, thus pressuring legislators
and regulators to retain existing definitions.
To be specific, consider the example of the types of information
that should be subject to protection. In the case of breach notification,
this information is most commonly referred to as “personal
information” or “personally identifiable information.” These terms have
widely varying definitions. At the state level, a least common
denominator exists: the combinations of an identifying item, most
commonly an individual’s name, with one of three categories of more
sensitive information:
• the individual’s Social Security Number;
• the individual’s financial account numbers, along with any
identification code necessary to access the account; or
• the individual’s government-issued identification number (usually
a driver’s license or state identification).

The stated purpose of most jurisdictions’ breach notification
statutes is to enable consumers to take steps to protect themselves by
requiring custodians of this information to inform consumers when
those custodians have lost control of this information.19 Yet many other
types of information may pose a great harm to consumers. For example:
• medical records;
• wills;
• diaries;
• private correspondence (including e-mail);
• financial records;
• photographs of a sensitive or private nature; and
• similar information

are all categories of information federal criminal law considers
sufficient to warrant substantial criminal sentence enhancements for
individuals convicted of computer crimes involving identity theft.20 The

18
19

As differentiated from new data generated as technology advances.
See, e.g., CAL. BILL. ANALYSIS, S.B. 1386, Cal. Assembly, 2001-2002 Reg. Sess. (Aug.
23, 2002) (Senate Third Reading, analysis of Saskia Kim).
20 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(16). See also id. at § 2B1.1
Application Notes.
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Department of Health and Human Services,21 the Department of the
Treasury,22 and the Federal Trade Commission23 each have offered
additional definitions of information they consider to be “sensitive” to
consumers. All of this information should be the subject of consumer
protection. Additionally, consumers should be informed whenever this
information is subject to unauthorized disclosure as is necessary to take
steps to protect themselves.
These categories are hardly comprehensive of the types of
information that need to be protected by comprehensive cybersecurity
regulations. Corporate trade secrets, including sensitive data about
products not yet available outside the United States; sensitive business
development plans; information about critical infrastructure systems,
such as water, electric, or telecommunications grids; and cybersecurity
plans are all sensitive information that are not the province of the
general consumer. Yet a failure to secure this information may have
costly effects, and not just to the organization experiencing the breach.
If a business partner of a new pharmaceutical company fails properly to
secure its information systems or the information technology services
provider to a major financial institution or exchange fails to implement
appropriate controls on administrative accounts, substantial negative
effects to the broad economy may result if those systems are
compromised. None of these eventualities necessarily involves
consumer information, but each clearly demonstrates a public interest in
collective security.
If a definition of information to be protected is developed based
solely on consumer breach notification, the downstream cybersecurity
implications will be costly. Either organizations must engage in
expensive reclassification of information and redesign of their
cybersecurity programs when new regulations are subsequently
implemented, or large areas of information may be left vulnerable if the
regulations fail to expand the definition of information to be protected.
In either case, the cost of considering breach notification separate from
comprehensive cybersecurity measures would be high.

21
22

See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 for definition of “individually identifiable health information.”
See 12 C.F.R. Pt. 364, App. B(I)(C)(2)(b) (“Consumer information means any record about
an individual, whether in paper, electronic, or other form, that is a consumer report or is derived
from a consumer report and that is maintained or otherwise possessed by or on behalf of the bank
for a business purpose. Consumer information also means a compilation of such records. The
term does not include any record that does not identify an individual.”).
23 See generally Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business, FEDERAL TRADE
COMM’N at 5, available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/bus69protecting-personal-information-guide-business_0.pdf (suggesting a broad definition of personal
information that includes “other sensitive data”).
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Comparative Efficacy: Comprehensive Regulation is More
Effective

In prior work, I examined the efficacy of existing cybersecurity
regulations,24 specifically including the breach notification statutes
present in most U.S. jurisdictions, and compared the effectiveness of
breach notification statutes and comprehensive cybersecurity regimes. I
combined qualitative, semi-structured interviews of Chief Information
Security Officers (CISO) at key U.S. organizations with quantitative
analysis of data breach incidence from 2000 through 2010. The results
described the effects of each regime at driving cybersecurity practices
within organizations, based primarily on the CISO interviews.
The interviewees reported that a primary effect of breach
notification laws was to focus intensive effort on encryption of portable
devices and media containing personal information.25 While effective at
reducing the number of reportable breaches, some respondents reported
that this resulted in focusing too much on only one area of security26—
effectively leaving other venues vulnerable to attack. These attacks
affect not only potential compromise of personal information as defined
in existing breach notification statutes, but also the ability of outside
attackers to compromise the integrity of critical infrastructure systems.
Such attacks are not hypothetical—in 1983, for example, a hacker
group compromised the security of Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer
Center in New York and gained access that effectively would have
allowed them to alter the radiation treatment protocols of patients.27
This compromise led to the addition in 1986 of a felony enhancement to
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for damaging computer systems
relating to medical care.28
As noted by the CISOs interviewed from the health care sector,
breach notification statutes forced them to focus increased resources on
encryption—without receiving additional resources to maintain existing
programs.29 The resultant reallocation of security budgets directed
resources away from the areas those CISOs believed were most in
need.30 I describe this phenomenon as “Locking the Bank or Vault Door
and Leaving the Back Window Open.”31 Focusing solely on consumer
breach notification may have detrimental effects to other, critical areas
of information security.

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

See generally Thaw, supra note 2.
Id. at 317–322.
Id.
See S. REP. NO. 99-432, at *2–3, 12 (1986).
See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5), (c)(4)(A)(i)(II) (2012).
See Thaw, supra note 2, at 368.
Id.
Id. at 361.
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The quantitative analysis conducted as part of this project confirms
the comparative efficacy of comprehensive cybersecurity regulation. By
analyzing periodic breach incidence data from January 1, 2000, through
December 31, 2010, I determined that the combination of consumer
breach notification and comprehensive cybersecurity regulation was as
much as four times more effective at preventing reportable breaches of
consumers’ personal information than was breach notification alone.32
Piecemeal regulation certainly has political and practical
advantages. Likewise, standalone breach notification regulation does
have certain advantages, most notably including highlighting the
presence of cybersecurity concerns by requiring organizations to report
certain breaches of security.33 However, these advantages are
substantially outweighed by the risks of unanticipated consequences and
definitional lock-in. When these risks are considered together with the
comparative efficacy of preventing reportable breaches, a
comprehensive approach to cybersecurity regulation is clearly
appropriate.
III. AFFIRMATIVE PRESUMPTION FAVORING INVESTIGATION
The conclusions in Part II do not, of course, suggest that breach
notification should be ignored. Quite the contrary—it is an essential
component of a comprehensive cybersecurity regulatory framework. In
considering the structure of this framework, however, it is crucial to
examine the incentives created by various presumptions within the
possible regulatory approaches. Any legal presumptions should favor
incentives that encourage better security practices, such as the conduct
of more thorough post-incident investigations.
When considering the issue of consumer breach notification,
legislators and regulators frequently confront the issue of when to
require notification. Among existing law, some jurisdictions require
notification in all cases of loss-of-control (subject to the “encryption
exception”34), whereas others adopt what is known as a “risk-of-harm”
threshold.35 The empirical data on the comparative efficacy of strict
liability versus “risk-of-harm” notification thresholds is incomplete.36
32
33
34

Id. at 355.
Id. at 349, 371.
See generally Data Breach Charts, BAKERHOSTETLER (2014), available at
http://www.bakerlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Data%20Breach%20documents/Data_Breac
h_Charts.pdf for a 50-state survey.
35 Id.
36 As of the time of this writing, the author is unaware of any unclassified examination of this
question. Some analyses have considered related questions but focus on other questions and are
not informative as to this point. See, e.g., Thaw, supra note 2. See also, e.g., Sasha Romanosky,
Rahul Telang, & Alessandro Acquisti, Do Data Breach Disclosure Laws Reduce Identity Theft?,
30(2) J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 256 (2011); Sasha Romanosky, David A. Hoffman, &
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The focus of this Part, therefore, addresses the cybersecurity
implications of certain formulations of the risk-of-harm threshold.
Specifically, for those jurisdictions adopting such a threshold, it is
important to recognize that some formulations of the threshold
negatively impact cybersecurity procedures and outcomes.
Risk-of-harm thresholds may have many forms but generally can
be categorized according to the affirmative or negative presumption of
notification. An affirmative presumption of notification requires a data
custodian who experiences a breach to affirmatively demonstrate that
the specified risk of harm threshold is not satisfied before they are
exempted from consumer notification requirements. A negative
presumption of notification does not require a data custodian who
experiences a breach to notify consumers unless an investigation reveals
that the specified risk of harm threshold has been satisfied.
A negative presumption of notification carries substantial,
worrisome implications for cybersecurity procedures and outcomes.
Specifically, this presumption disincentivizes organizations from
conducting thorough security investigations.
Organizations have incentives to limit the scope and scale of
investigations that may uncover information potentially exposing the
organization to liability. For example, when conducting comprehensive
cybersecurity assessments, auditing and consulting firms often work
together with law firms so that the results of these assessments will be
privileged as attorney-client work product and thus not subject to
discovery in civil litigation or regulatory investigations. Clients of such
firms often desire to learn about the risks they face, but do not want to
incur liability for failure to remediate security vulnerabilities identified
in the assessment. This problem is particularly compounded when faced
with low-probability/high-risk vulnerabilities for which the cost of
remediation is high. While generally protected by the business judgment
rule, executives of publicly traded organizations still bear a fiduciary
duty to act in the best interests of their shareholders. A risk analysis
might well reveal that the probability is sufficiently low not to justify
the direct costs of remediation when combined with the cost of business
disruption and other indirect cost. While I do not suggest that
organizations engage in willful ignorance of their legal or regulatory
obligations, my research data and professional experience support the
conclusion that organizations can have substantial incentive not to
pursue a comprehensive investigation if it might trigger additional
regulatory compliance requirements.37 Conversely, if pursuing that
investigation might alleviate the organization of regulatory compliance
requirements (e.g., exempt the organization from consumer
Alessandro Acquisti, Empirical Analysis of Data Breach Litigation, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 74 (2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1986461.
37 See generally Thaw, supra note 2.
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notification), my research and professional experience support the
conclusion that organizations can have substantial incentive to
thoroughly pursue that investigation.
Thus, an affirmative presumption of notification is superior from a
cybersecurity perspective. Such a presumption avoids disincentivizing
thorough cybersecurity investigations, which are one of the most
important tools in protecting consumers against future data breaches and
securing existing information systems.
CONCLUSION
The primary goal of this Essay is to apply existing empirical
analysis and analytical modeling to describe characteristics and suggest
predictions about the function and effects of data breach notification
laws. It suggests three primary conclusions in this regard. First, that a
well-defined definition of cybersecurity, including the unit of analysis
of protection, is critical to any discussion of data breach notification
regulation. Second, that data breach notification regulation is more
appropriate as part of a comprehensive cybersecurity regulatory regime.
Third, that when using a risk-of-harm threshold for when notification is
required, that threshold should employ an affirmative presumption
requiring notification.
Notwithstanding this primary goal, these conclusions suggest some
modest policy prescriptions. These suggestions build on similar regimes
found in states such as New York,38 Massachusetts,39 and Virginia,40
each of which require notification to central state regulatory authorities
in addition to notification to consumers in the event of a reportable data
breach. Such a bifurcated notification regime could be adopted at a
federal level and in other nations currently without data breach
notification regulations.
Under such a bifurcated notification regime, organizations
experiencing a loss-of-control of any covered data would be required to
report that incident to a centralized reporting authority, most likely a
federal regulator such as the United States Federal Trade Commission.
Consumer reporting would be triggered in certain cases deemed
appropriate to when consumers can take steps to protect themselves
and/or when consumers have an interest in awareness that their sensitive
information was subject to unauthorized disclosure.
This bifurcated notification regime, if properly implemented, could
achieve many of the goals of consumer breach notification while
mitigating the risks of “over-notification” often raised by critics of strict
38
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See generally N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa (McKinney 2013).
See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H-1 (2015).
See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6 (2014).

164

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE•NOVO

2015

loss-of-control regimes.41 Specifically, consumers would receive
appropriate notification, while all incidents would nonetheless be
reported. Thorough information security investigations would be a
requirement under this regime as part of the centralized reporting
requirement. Additionally, the regulatory agency receiving the reports
would have the ability to follow up in cases where they suspect
consumer notification should have occurred but did not, to follow up if
there is evidence a broader pattern of information security deficiencies
may be present, or to follow up and provide support if it believes the
organization requires additional information security and/or law
enforcement support.
I stress that this proposal is preliminary, and I lay out the basic
characteristics as guidelines.

41 This is not to suggest that valid empirical evidence exists indicating over-notification
currently is or is not a problem. The conclusion, rather, only suggests that if over-notification is of
concern (as suggested by some experts testifying before Congress), a bifurcated notification
regime can address such concerns. See, e.g., Reporting Data Breaches: Is Federal Legislation
Needed to Protect Consumers?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., & Trade of
the Comm. on House Energy & Commerce, 113th Cong. 6 (July 18, 2013) (statement of Dan
Liutikas, Chief Legal Officer, CompTIA), available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/
20130718/101152/HHRG-113-IF17-Wstate-LiutikasD-20130718.pdf. See also Reporting Data
Breaches: Is Federal Legislation Needed to Protect Consumers?: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce, Mfg., & Trade of the Comm. on House Energy & Commerce, 113th Cong. 9 (July
18, 2013) (statement of Jeffrey E. Greene, Senior Policy Counsel, Cybersecurity and Identity
Symantec Corp.), available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/Testimony-Greene-CMT-Data-Breaches-Consumer-Protection-2013-7-18.pdf;
Reporting Data Breaches: Is Federal Legislation Needed to Protect Consumers?: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., & Trade of the Comm. on House Energy & Commerce, 113th
Cong. 6 (July 18, 2013) (statement of Kevin M. Richards, Senior Vice President, Federal
Government Affairs TechAmerica ), available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/Testimony-Richards-CMT-Data-Breaches-Consumer-Protection2013-7-18.pdf. See also generally Reporting Data Breaches: Is Federal Legislation Needed to
Protect Consumers?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., & Trade of the Comm.
on House Energy & Commerce, 113th Cong. (July 18, 2013) (Hearing Video Transcript),
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=wk75dSAb8A8.

